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HEARING ON A BILL: LEGISLATIVE FOLKLORE?
JuLtUS COHEN*
A CONGRESSMAN or Senator introduces a bill. Beyond the fact that
it entails the formality of dropping a written instrument into the
legislative hopper, what does this seemingly simple act mean? A
moment's reflection will reveal that it involves a complex of at
least three distinct elements. It means, first of all, that the author
of the proposal assumes the existence of a fact situation, the correction of which is sought on the legislative level; secondly, that the
method advanced for dealing with the situation is believed to be
an appropriate method or means for bringing about an immediate
end or goal; thirdly, that the immediate end sought would be instrumental in achieving an even higher or more inclusive end or
goal. These constituent elements-the present fact situation, the
means-ends hypothesis, the instrumental value judgment, together
constitute the very essence of a legislative proposal. Thus, before it
was enacted, the meaning of the recent bill to abolish the federal tax
on oleomargarine consisted of (1) an assumption of a present fact
situation (among others) that oleomargarine is a food which contains nutrients that are beneficial to human health, and that poor
people were not at the time able to purchase it at a price that they
could afford to pay; (2) a means-end hypothesis (among others)
that the passage of the measure would bring a healthful food product
to the poor man's table; and (3) an instrumental value judgment
(among others) that we ought to make colored oleomargarine more
readily available to lower economic groups because it would be more
in keeping with the broader goal of economic justice to the poor.
It will readily be seen that the first two of these elements deal
directly with aspects of experience-the first with past and present
experience, the second with the future. Both of them are in the
realm of fact, with respect to which tools for observation and techniques for prediction and empirical confirmation are applicable.
Although the third, or "ought" element, is by its very nature normative in quality and therefore non-experiential, there are observable
consequences of an instrumental "ought" choice to which these
tools and techniques are also applicable.
Obviously, if the broad value goal is applied to a set of facts assumed to be true, but which are actually false, or on the strength of a
means-end hypothesis which experience has rejected, or is conditioned upon an instrumental value which would effectuate a con*'Professorof Law, University of Nebraska.
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trary end, the application would be erroneous. Thus, hypothetically
speaking, if it could reliably be shown (1) that the allegations of
the present fact situation were not true-that, for example, oleomargarine is abundantly available to the poor, or (2) that the meansend hypothesis is faulty because the elimination of the tax would
simply fatten the pocketbooks of manufacturers without reducing
the price of oleomargarine, or (3) that making oleomargarine
available to the poor would have consequences that would somehow
result in greater economic injustice to the underprivileged-the broad
value goal which the bill would seek to implement would not be
realized. Accordingly, a bill would be defective and thus vulnerable
to attack if the assumptions which underly any one or all of the
three constituent elements would be found wanting. In the same
way, a judicial decision would be defective when a law would
be applied to an erroneous set of facts-when, for example; a criminal statute making it unlawful to take the life of another human
would be applied with full sanction to one who really did not commit the act. In the legislative realm, what would result would be
a non-realization of a value goal; in the judicial, it would be a
denial of justice.
Thousands of bills of varying degrees of complexity are introduced during each session of Congress. (There were 8,215 bills,
exclusive of joint, simple and concurrent resolutions, that were
introduced in the first session of the 82nd Congress, from January 3
through October 20, 1951.) How does the legislative arm of our
government check on the accuracy of the fact situations, the
plausibility of the means-end hypotheses, and the efficacy of the
instrumental value judgments which underly each of them? What
machinery, if any, is available to Congress for avoiding error with
respect to the claims and assumptions made concerning these component elements which are inherent in all proposed legislation?
Obviously, it cannot be the machinery of the first and third
"readings" of a bill, because they are purely perfunctory in nature
-the first reading being a recital of the title of the bill, the third
being for purposes of engrossment. And it certainly cannot be the
machinery of debate on the House or Senate floor, for rarely has
it been used to generate other than heat. To use Woodrow Wilson's
expression, Congress during debate is "Congress on public exhibition," not "Congress at work."' And what was apparently true
in 1884, when Wilson recorded his views on the subject is apparI. Wilson, Congressional Government 79 (3d ed. 1885).
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ently confirmed by the very recent observations of a distinguished
member of the upper Chamber, who, in a bitter attack on the
workings of this phase of the legislative process, borrowed from
Hamlet by describing it as "words, words, words."2 The ready
answer, of course, is the hearing process, which becomes operative
upon the "second reading" of a legislative proposal. If there is to
be any check at all on these three component elements of a bill,
it must be during the hearing on the measure, for it is here that the
Committee to which it is referred is presumed to study it in its
various ramifications before it passes judgment on it-either by
recommending it for passage or defeat, or by "pigeon-holing" it
and thereby refusing to report it out. But what kind of study is
undertaken? And by whom? What is the nature of the process?
The answers to these questions vary, of course, with the different
legislative committees, but those who have observed the hearing
process at close range should, at least in part, recognize certain
familiar aspects in the rough sketch that follows.
The chairman of the standing committee to which a bill is referred obtains his venerable position of power through seniority,
that is, as a political reward by the party in power for having managed to remain in office for a long period of time. The dominance of
the chairman's position ordinarily allows him to play the leading
role in determining the composition of the committee's staff, that
is, the professional and clerical members who handle the details
of the committee work, and oftentimes its planning. All too often he
simply presents a completed slate of candidates to the other members of the committee, and asks their approval. 3 Generally, there is
acquiescence in his choice, partly out of a desire to avoid a clash
with the chairman, because of the fear of political reprisal; partly
because of the realization that if any of them ever became a chairman of a committee they, too, would wish to wield similar power
without challenge. Present acquiescence, then, in the chairman's
activities is simply a way of making a good investment for the
future. In filling the positions on the staff, especially those of clerk,
counsel, assistant counsel, economists, etc., which carry with them
fairly lucrative salaries, a great deal of regard is given to political
considerations: to patronage, the building of fences for the next
election, the payment of political debts, the bowing to the demands
2. See the speech on "Loquacity of Senatorial Speeches" by Senator
Matthew M. Neely, Cong. Record, November 14, 1951, Appendix A7241.
3. For confirmatory experience, see Voorhis, Congressional Investigations: Inner Workings, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 455, 458 (1951).
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of particular pressure groups that have a stake in the proposals
over which the committee has jurisdiction. Training and ability,
though considered, are too frequently of secondary importance, with
the result that one often finds a strange admixture of personnel
on committee staffs-hacks, political "has beens," relatives, opportunists seeking to capitalize on contacts, shrewd representatives of
special interests, and even an occasional high talented individual
with the public interest at heart. If the party in power is in control by a very narrow margin of House and Senate seats, the
minority will likely be given the opportunity to select some of the
staff personnel who are of their own political persuasion. This not
only permits the ranking minority committee members to partake
of a share of the patronage but makes it possible for the "outs" to
keep the "ins" under competitive political surveillance. It is the
spoils system, then, that casts a shadow on the quality of the staff
personnel of the committees that are entrusted with the task of
passing on the merits of Congressional legislative proposals.
When political considerations are thus operative, the committee
staff can be expected to employ its collective skills to aid the interests
of those who were responsible for their hiring; and, because of this,
the chances that they will be guided in their work by a detached
but zealous regard for the public interest cannot be expected to be
very great. It is not common for a committee staff to be selected
for its competence in making independent critical investigations of
the fact situation which prompts a legislative proposal, the meansend hypothesis which is advanced for correcting the situation, and
the efficacy of the instrumental value judgment which underlies ita task which calls for skills of the highest caliber, and for an objective
frame of mind that is not harnessed to power politics. And why,
one may ask? Simply because the making of critical independent
investigations is not primarily the task which the committee ordinarily sets out to perform during a hearing on a bill. This is evident
alone from the very size of committee staffs. For even assuming,
arguendo, that they were of the highest expert competence, and
selected solely for the purpose of undertaking critical investigation
and research, their total number is so pitifully small that, even with
an occasional assist from the Legislative Reference Service of the
Library of Congress, they could not even begin to do an effective job.
(It has been estimated that in the second session of the 81st Congress, the combined professional and clerical staffs of all of the
committees of both the House and the Senate numbered 614. Of these
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290 were professionals, or approximately one-half a professional
4
staff member for each member of Congress.)
But if critical investigation is not the major task of the committee staff, then what is? This depends on several situations. If
the committee chairman or other influential committee members
working through the chairman are already committed to the passage of a bill even prior to the hearings-an experience which is
not uncommon-then one of the major tasks of the staff is the delicate one of slanting the hearing, of manipulating the hearing machinery in such a way that a previous commitment on a bill would
be made to appear as a decision reached by rational, detached
deliberation, after all of the evidence is in-a post hoc ergo propter
hoc in artistic disguise.5 This the staff can do by several means:
by inviting the strongest, most persuasive witnesses to testify on
behalf of the measure; by endeavoring to limit the number of strong
opposition witnesses to a minimum; by asking "proper" questions
of "friendly" witnesses and embarrassing ones who are "unfriendly"; by arranging to close the hearing at a propitious time; by
writing a report which brings out the best features of the testimony
in favor of the bill and the most unfavorable features of that
offered by the opposition; by subduing or discarding facts which
do not fit the pattern of preconceived notions, opinions or prejudices.
If the previous commitment is to defeat or limit the proposal, the
slanting of the hearing can be arranged in the other direction. In
addition, the bill might be given the "killed-with-kindness" treatment-that is, given so lengthy a hearing that no time is left prior
to adjournment to consider the measure on the House or Senate
floor, thus assuring its defeat. Or a hearing may be denied altogether
by "pigeon-holing" it, that is, by not placing it on the committee
agenda. This, too, results in a virtual defeat of the measure, for it is
thereby denied a place on the House and Senate calendars, and
may not be considered on the floor of either house unless a motion
to discharge the bill from the committee is adopted-a procedure
rarely tried, and when tried, rarely successful.
4. See Meader, Congressional Investigations: Importance of the FactFinding Process, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 449, 451 (1951).
5. In a study on "The Staffing of the Committees of Congress," (The
Bureau of Government Research, University of Kentucky, 1949, p. 39)
Gladys M. Kammerer reported that: "A substantial number of professional
members of Congress utilize data reported by staff only to bolster a preconceived notion or position dictated by party commitments. Facts which do
not fit the pattern of their opinions or prejudices are discarded by many when
reaching conclusions as to committee action. Such rejection of staff efforts
eventually leads to serious frustration and intellectual stultification."
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If there is no previous commitment on a bill, the hearing often
serves less as a method for ascertaining the adequacy of the evidence presented in favor of or against it than it is for providing
pressure groups and constituents an opportunity to "blow off
steam," and for offering Senators and Congressmen an indication
of the alignments of the functional interests which have a stake
in the outcome of the measure. It gives the legislators a cue to
the direction of the political currents which are generated by a proposal; it provides an opportunity to assess the relative weights of
the competing forces and to gauge the possible effect of these forces
upon their political fortunes. The very appearance of a witness as a
representative of a powerful group is a subtle reminder that it might
cost precious votes or support in the next compaign if the measure
under consideration is not dealt with "properly." If a fellow Congressman or Senator, for political or other considerations, accompanies a witness or a delegation from home, a speech before the
Committee on behalf of his constituents carries with it a suggestion
that fellow Congressmen and Senators have ways of paying back
favors or disfavors in kind.
At first blush, the procedural trappings of a hearing might give
the uninitiated the impression that its primary purpose is to dig
objectively into the facts which prompted the introduction of a
bill. to check the claims concerning the means-end hypotheses, and
to explore the efficacy of the value judgments which are involved.
There is usually an aura of informal dignity that prevails; the committee members, clerk and counsel, appear judicious in their bearing; often there are microphones, and the presence of photographers
and reporters add somehow to the seriousness and importance of
the occasion. But once the hearing is under way, it soon becomes
evident that the procedure is not geared for a critical study of the
three component elements of a bill. Witness after witness makes an
appearance, states his name and connections, and usually proceeds to read from a prepared statement, even though advance
copies may already be in the hands of the committee and press.
Evidence of all sorts is introduced to establish the fact situation
which prompted the introduction of a bill-materials ranging
from mere opinion, to bold assertions, to expert testimony; often
it is embellished by the elaborate charts, graphs, statistical tables,
etc., which are inserted into the record without critical analysis and
discussion. In dealing with the means-end hypothesis, opposing
witnesses, each with conflicting interests in the outcome of the
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proposal, present competing testimonials concerning the predicted
consequences of the bill--dire or wonderful, as the case may be,
and each likely maintaining that, if the view of the other prevails, it would conflict with those basic values which most of
us hold dear. Unless a committee member has a special interest
in or commitment concerning the outcome of the proposed legislation, or an eager committee counsel wishes to make his presence felt by asking a few stray questions, the evidentiary materials
presented by the witness are often apt to go unchallenged. The witness is thanked and commended for a "fine, forthright presentation,"
and the next one is summoned to do his little stint. When to all
of this is added the fact that, in the case of all too many committees, hearings are held with only the chariman and the staff
in attendance-the committee members who are to pass judgment
on a proposal being not infrequently absent-or are held in the
presence of members who saunter in after the hearing is under
way, and therefore are unable properly to listen to the testimony
in full context, the non-judicious quality of a hearing on a bill be6
comes apparent.
Of course, the testimony could still be read by the committee
members, for a full verbatim account of hearing proceedings is
ordinarily recorded and printed. But it would be rare indeed to find
a Congressman or Senator or their harassed staff members who
would have the time or inclination to study the voluminous testimony of an ordinary hearing on a bill in the same way that, say.
an appellate court would study the transcript of a record for the
purpose of scrutinizing trial proceedings.
If all of this has any semblance of the truth, how then, it may
be asked, can a reliable report be made on the merits or demerits
of a legislative proposal to the House or the Senate? Is the committee report and recommendation a decision not unlike a judicial
opinion rendered after all of the evidence and arguments have
been presented? It is a decision, to be sure, and carries considerable
weight with the House and Senate-indeed, as has often happened,
a favorable or unfavorable report by a committee on a bill may well
mean its very life or death. But unlike a judicial decision, it is
doubtful if it is reached by many committee members after due
6. "It is a common and discouraging experience on Capitol Hill for invited witnesses, who have worked hard and long on the preparation of their
testimony, to appear before committees and find only one or a few members
present." Galloway, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. XLV Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 41, 48 (1951).
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consideration and deliberation of the record. It is the committee staff
that usually culls the transcript of the hearings and prepares a preliminary report-a "committee print"--pointed to a recommendation that would, in its judgment, be palatable to the dominant members of the committee. But, too frequently, its palatability depends
on considerations wholly unrelated to the formal hearings-on a
friendly call from the chairman or party functionary urging a member to "go along"; on promises or threats of reprisals from Congressmen or Senators interested in the passage or defeat of a bill;
on pressure from constituents or groups who might be helpful to
his political fortunes. The decision is frequently made the same way
that music is frequently played-by ear; and even though the transcript of the hearing is available, and looks impressive, it often has
as much bearing or influence on the decision of the committee concerning the bill as does the chaplain's prayer on the legislative
business which promptly follows in its wake. And if this is true of
the committee that is charged with the duty of studying a legislative
proposal, it would seem, a fortiori, to be true with respect to the
rest of the membership of the House or Senate when the measure
is brought up for debate and vote. To be sure, excerpts from the
transcript of a hearing are sometimes utilized to bolster the positions
of proponents or opponents of a bill during debate, but whether
the position is one of opposition or support is likely determined not
by a previous consideration of the evidence adduced at the hearing, but upon factors-political and otherwise-which are extrinsic
to it. The legislative hearing, then, has all of the outward appearances of an impartial device for adjudging a legislative proposal
on its merits: the adversary interests are usually permitted to
present their respective views (that is, when the bill is not "pigeonholed"), the testimony is recorded, a printed report is prepared-in
brief, it would seem that a bill is ordinarily given its day in court.
But to limit one's observation of a process to the external trappings
alone results in serious distortion. It obscures the fact that the
machinery set up for the hearing is a prize that can be captured
and manipulated to the advantage of the political forces that happen at the time to be in command; it hides from view the fact that
a hearing is not primarily a genuine trial of a policy issue; that the
committee which conducts the hearing-and this includes the staff
members-is not in the main, geared to make any impartial, independent studies of its own; and that legislators, though posing as
judges in committees, are themselves advocates or partisans who are
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mindful of advantages for themselves, for their constituents and for
their parties.
But if such be the nature of the legislative "beast," then why
go through the motions of a hearing on a bill? Why perpetuate the
myth that a bill is ordinarily given its day in court? Why complicate
unnecessarily the harassed life of the average Congressman and
Senator by endeavoring to foist on him the duties for which his
talents are not especially equipped, and for which he scarcely has
any time, considering the tremendous demands upon his office. For
the task of checking the immediate fact situation which a legislative proposal seeks to correct, something more is necessary than
mere testimonials from witnesses with axes to grind. To begin with,
there are many so-called facts for which science has provided no
adequate measuring rods, and for which testimonials at a hearing
furnish no illumination at all. How, for example, reliably measure
the extent of juvenile delinquency-the unapprehended as well as
the apprehended varieties; or the extent, if any, that capital punishment has been a deterrent to the commission of crime? At best, testimonials concerning such facts are but unconfirmed hypotheses; and
because, more often than not, they come in pairs-that is, a denial
and an affirmation, there is, too frequently, nothing reliable upon
which to lean. Of the facts that are ascertainable and measurable,
the hearing is too often not the proper forum for getting at them.
It frequently requires independent empirical field studies, on-thespot investigations, and the examination of witnesses other than
those, who, because of financial resources or political backing, are
able to present their case at a formal hearing in Washington. It is
also not the proper forum for ascertaining the efficacy of the meansend hypotheses contained in legislative proposals, or the consequences that would or would not flow if the policies which they
embody are adopted. Both of these latter two matters involve predictions; and whether they meet the requirements of scientific
probability cannot be ascertained by the jury-like device of observing the countenances and grimaces of witnesses. Whether reliable
evidence exists to justify claims concerning means-end hypotheses.
or the probable consequences of policy decisions, cannot ordinarily
be ascertained by the heat of affirmation and denial of witnesses at
a hearing, but by a cool, dispassionate examination of our accumulated knowledge. If because of human limitations such knowledge
is unavailable, a hearing surely would not produce it.
For a serious investigation of the three component elements of
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proposed legislation, an entirely different machinery as well as
quality of personnel would be necessary. To begin with, inasmuch
as the average Congressman or Senator has neither the time nor the
training for this function, he should not be required to participate
in the proceedings of investigations. Participation in such proceedings by the President or his cabinet members is not required or
expected when they are engaged in recommending legislation to
Congress. They rely basically on the research of experts and
others for fact information-research which is based on methods
far niore elaborate and intensive that that ordinarily utilized by the
legislative branch of government. Once this information is made
available, the concern of the executive is with the policy that should
be taken regarding it. His task involves a search for the larger
goal or policy end, and a subsidiary determination of whether
the aim of a specific policy proposal is consistent with these
ends. It is, in essence, a political judgment concerning the
wisdom of the proposal-assuming the facts upon which it is based.
If this is true for the executive, why should it be any less true for
the legislator, for is this not precisely the nature of his job, too?
Is it not a task for which his talents should be peculiarly suited, and
for which he is politically responsible if they are not? Why not,
then, a fair division of labor in this age of specialization? Why not
leave the fact-gathering relating to the three component elements
of bills to fact-gathering specialists, thereby permitting the legislator more time and energy for the primary task of policy-making,
of judging the wisdom of legislative proposals-for the problem
of ascertaining the broad goals towards which the nation and his
immediate constituency are striving, for balancing and reconciling
the conflicts between them. Why unnecessarily encumber the legislator's life by requiring him to attend and participate in the fiact-finding process which is preliminary to policy-making. If error in policy
results from error in the facts which underly any one or all three of
the component elements of proposed legislation, it surely cannot be
reduced to a minimum by continuing the hearing as it is presently
constituted. What is needed is a large, independent staff of competent investigators, selected without reference to political party
affiliation, and trained in scientific method and in the specialized
disciplines to which the legislative proposals relate. Those who
introduce bills could be required to append to each of them a statement of the fact situation which prompted the proposal, a justification for the means-end hypothesis that is advanced and a rationale
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of the instrumental value judgment which it embodies. Bills could
be routed to the staff after first reading for an initial processing and
preliminary report on whether the salient information involved is
"ascertainable," "non-ascertainable," "partially ascertainable," etc.;
if capable of being ascertained, what it would involve by way of time,
expense and facilities for the job. If it is determined that an investigation would yield no fruitful information because of the lack
of available time or adequate knowledge, or of the absence of the
know-how for getting at that knowledge (as is, regrettably, too
often the case), the investigation would be dispensed with and the
legislator would be obliged, as he is now, to rely on his own resources or intuitive judgment for guidance. If it is determined,
however, that the facts are objectively ascertainable, and an investigation is undertaken, it would be designed to cut unnecessary
conjecture and disputation to a minimum, to yield the maximum
amount of reliable information and to distill it in the alembic of
impartial critical judgment. The methods utilized-whether by
interview, testimonial, field study, etc.-would be designed and
tailored to fit the specific legislative proposal; and the allegations
advanced with respect to them would be independently checked. A
documented report issued by a distinguished, independent staff, bent
on not compromising with the truth, would have real stature-indeed, sufficient to be taken seriously by the public and the press, and,
in turn, by the law-makers in Congress. Once the report is released,
it could be subjected to the spotlight of public scrutiny and criticized
for avoidable bias or error. With such a staff and procedure for making investigations, the unprepared legislative branch would be
better able to compete with the executive, whose expert witnesses,
heavily laden with data and arguments, have long dominated the
hearing process when administration bills are involved. One of the
major contributing factors to the decline of Congressional government is the absence of factual information and knowledge upon
which sound policy decisions must be bottomed. Armed with independent fact-finding and fact-checking facilities, Congressmen
and Senators would be better able to meet the executive branch
on its own level, thereby effectuating a greater check and balance
and a more genuine separation of powers than has existed in recent
years.
If it is argued that such a change in the procedure would deprive legislators of convenient sounding boards for gauging the
alignments and strength of the political forces involved in a legisla-
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tive proposal, it may be suggested that other sounding boards are
surely not unavailable. It would be rare, indeed, if facilities other
than the hearing were lacking for ascertaining the direction and
strength of political winds. The vocal ones-those who usually
monopolize the hearing process as it is now constituted-would
somehow find a way to be heard, hearing or no hearing. If it is
maintained that the hearing is needed as an outlet for psychological
tensions, that is, as a method for permitting those involved in a competitive legislative struggle to "blow off steam," is it not in order to
ask whether the release of such tensions could not be achieved some
other way than by disguising its purpose? Why dress the hearing
up in formal fact-searching and fact-finding attire. If it is
argued, further, that to revamp the present hearing procedure
would deprive constituents and pressure groups of a forum for
getting their "day in court," for presenting their "case," and for
being "heard," it need only be pointed out that a critical study and
evaluation of the component elements of a legislative proposal is
not a judicial controversy at all; that the methods of court trial
are not necessary for scrutinizing these component elements; and,
finally, that to insist on the formal trappings of a procedure that is
often empty is to cling not to principles of democracy and good
government, but to a world of folklore and make-believe.
Now, all of this should not be taken to mean that no hearing
ol any bill ever yields anything worthwhile or ever shed any
valuable light on proposed legislation. To so hold would be misleading. There have doubtless been many instances in which the
clash of adversaries, the cross-questioning of alert Congressmen
and Senators, and the work of committee staffs have illuminated
policy issues and have clarified complicated issues of fact; and there
have doubtless been instances in which committee reports have played an important role in influencing the course of policy decisions.
But these instances no more hide the deep-rooted weaknesses of
the process than the bright spots of a city lift the pall of darkness
from its slums. For under the hearing process as it now exists,
there is reason to believe that too few of those who hear are really
equipped to hear, and too little of that which should be heard is
actually heard.

